Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine
Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been a debate as to the usefulness of various platforms on the contemporary battlefield and the implications of new technology for established concepts of combined arms manoeuvre.1 There have also been extensive descriptions of how Russian and Ukrainian forces have adapted to these challenges. It is not self-evident, however, that NATO forces – preparing their first echelon to fight a reclamation battle against Russia in 2028 – should adopt the practices of Ukrainian units which are optimising their third or fourth echelon to attrit Russian forces as part of an area defence in 2025.
This paper presents the conclusions of forces in Ukraine that are developing and experimenting with approaches to conducting combined arms manoeuvre under modern conditions. The paper is not an attempt to describe how most units are operating, other than highlighting the pressures that forces must manage in modern operations. Instead, it explores the concepts of operation being developed and successfully employed by a subset of units that have had disproportionate success. Because of the function they serve, these units are analogous to NATO battlegroups. The paper describes how these Ukrainian units combine the tools of modern war, and endeavours to highlight the specific utility of different capabilities and their complementarity.