The Calm Before the Swarm: Drone Warfare at Sea in the Age of the Missile
We are not yet at a paradigm-shifting moment in the role of autonomous or robotic systems at sea. Nor are we likely to reach a revolutionary precipice within the period in which the U.S. Navy must begin making the transition to a truly hybrid fleet — that is, the integration of autonomous platforms designed to operate as part of an ocean-going battle force. This means the Navy’s approach to acquiring and fielding unmanned systems for deployment at sea should ultimately reinforce and support the maritime domain’s still-dominant weapons system: long-range anti-ship missiles.
We have learned a lot about the use of unmanned systems in Ukraine and the Red Sea. Yet we risk misapplying lessons from these often land-based conflicts if we do not consider the unique nature of war from the sea, where longer ranges, maneuvering targets, and weapons systems (ships and aircraft) are inherently limited in what they can carry to the fight. Naval analysts should interpret lessons on unmanned systems employment within the unique constraints of operating from the maritime domain. We can do that by looking at the intersection of cost, plenty, survivability, and reconstitution. In Ukraine and Yemen, a reliance on plentiful and cheap systems, a dearth of sophisticated weapons, relatively close quarters, and largely interior (or illicit) lines of communication all encourage combatants to prioritize the regeneration of cheap drones over weapons system survivability as the simplest pathway to combat resilience. Simply put, it is easier to acquire thousands of replacement racing drones or dozens of loitering munitions than to invest in higher-cost, more complex, less risk-worthy platforms and weapons.